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ABSTRACT
In this dissertion Operation Provide Comfort is 
evaluated from the Turkish perspective. The Operation has 
created much controversy in Turkish foreign affairs yet 
little information about has been accessible. Successive 
governments between 1991 and 1994 have failed to dissolve 
doubts concerning the Operation and this has led to 
speculation over ’foreign forces” in Turkey, their ’real” 
aims, deployment, operational principles and even "relations 
with the PKK”.
Trying to find answers to these questions has proven 
extremely difficult because the Turkish political parties 
failed to record their proceedings. Also, many documents 
being held by the Ministries and the Turkish General Staff 
are classified and therefore inaccessible. For this reason,
I had to rely on personal contacts as well as materials 
gathered from the Turkish Grand National Assembly Library, 
the American Embassy, Bilkent University Library, the Middle 
East Technical University Library, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Bureau of United Nations in Turkey.
The main objective of this dissertation is to present the 
different views prevailing on the Turkish side and to trace 
their origins. To achieve this, Turkish perceptions and 
responses to OPC from its inception to the present day are 
chronologically listed.
The thesis consists of three parts: developments leading
to the creation of OPC and the evolution of OPC ’ s force 
posture; the debates pertaining to OPC and the views of 
successive governments,as well as political parties, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish General Staff. 
The thesis concludes with a critical evaluation of the 
arguments and debates concerning the OPC. Ultimately, the 
objective of this thesis is to present the views of the 
involved parties in Turkey so that it would be useful to 
those wishing to understand the issue.
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ONSOZ
Bu tezde Operation Provide Comfort (Çekiç Güç) , Türk 
bakış açısından incelendi. Bu konu hakkında o kadar az bilgi 
dışarıya verildi ki, OPC, Türk Dış Politikasında çok fazla 
zıt görüşe yol açtı. 1991 ve 1994 arasındaki iktidarlar da bu 
tavrı devam ettirince şüphelerin dağıtılması mümkün olmadı. 
Bu da sonuçta "yabancı güçler", bunların "gerçek amaçları", 
"operasyon prensipleri" ve hatta "PKK ile ilişkilerine" 
varıncaya dek birçok spekülasyona yol açtı.
Bu sorulara yanıt aramak da oldukça zordu. Zira Türk 
partileri hiçbir tutanak tutmuyordu. Bakanlıklardaki ve 
Genelkurmay Başkanlığı'ndaki bilgiler de gizli tutuluyordu. 
Bu nedenlerle kişisel ilişkilerime dayanarak T.B.M.M., 
O.D.T.Ü. ve Bilkent Üniversitesi Kütüphaneleri ile Amerikan 
Büyükelçiği, Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Ankara'daki BM 
Temsilciliği’nden dokümanlar toplayarak tezimi tamamladım.
Bu tezin temel amacı OPC hakkındaki Türk tezlerini ve 
bunların arkasındaki nedenleri araştırmaktır. Bunu yaparken 
Türk görüşleri ve tepkileri başlangıcından günümüze dek 
tarihsel sıralama ile incelenmiştir.
Tez üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde OPC'nin 
oluşturulmasına yol açan sebeplere ve OPC'nin güç yapısındaki 
değişimlere değinilmekte; ikinci bölümde, bu dönemdeki
V ı l
iktidarlar ve partilerin görüşleri ile Dışişleri Bakaniğı'nın 
ve Genelkurmay Başkanlığı’nın görüşleri verilmekte ve son 
bölümde de tartışmaların ve yanıtların arandığı genel bir 
değerlendirme bulunmaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu tezle, bu konuyu 
daha yakından tanımak isteyenlere bir bütün olarak Türk 
tarafında OPC ile ilgili tarafların düşünceleri verilmek 
istenmiştir.
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CHAPTER I
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT - A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE
1.1. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE CREATION OF OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT
In order to evaluate the pertinent aspects of Operation 
Provide Comfort, it is necessary to study the developments 
which led to the undertaking of this operation. The Gulf 
Crisis began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 
1990 (See Appendix), a clear violation of the international 
law principle - "respect for the territorial integrity of 
nations". Therefore, in defence of international law and this 
principle, the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) decided 
to force Iraq to act in line with international law under the 
authority of Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VII states 
that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breakdown of peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what 
measures should be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security .
The UNSC passed 24 resolutions related to the Gulf crisis. 
Resolution 660 concerned the invasion and demanded that Iraq 
should immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces.
On 6 August 1990 the UNSC voted to impose economic sanctions 
against Iraq but excluded medical supplies, humanitarian aid 
and foodstuffs.
Between 2 August and 29 November 1990, the UNSC passed 12 
resolutions related to the situation (See Appendix) 
Resolution 678, adopted on 2 9 November 1990 by 12 members of 
the Security Council- Canada, France, Romania, Soviet Union, 
United Kingdom, United States, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Finland and Malaysia - specified that if Iraq does 
not fully implement UNSC Resolutions relating to the 
occupation of Kuwait by January 1990, Member States, 
cooperating with Kuwait's legitimate Government, would be 
authorized to use all necessary means to compel Iraq to do so 
and restore international peace and security in the area. The 
necessary means, as stated in Articles 41 and 42 , would be
"partial or complete" interruption of economic relations and 
means of communication and the severance of diplomatic 
relations. Should these measures prove inadequate, the UNSC 
would take such action by air, sea and land forces as would 
be be necessary to restore international peace and security.
On 16 January 19 91, one day after the deadline, the 
United States, in coordination with the Government of Kuwait, 
began military operations. After heavy bombardment of the 
Iraqi forces, Kuwait City was retaken on 27 February. On 2 
March 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 686, demanding Iraq 
to declare its acceptance of the 12 resolutions. On 3 March 
1991, Iraq informed the Secretary General and the President
of the Security Council that it agreed to fulfill all 
obligations specified in Resolution 686. On 6 April 1991, 
Iraq officaly notified the Secretary General and the 
President of the Security Council that it agreed to the 
provisions of Resolution 687.
However, especially after the actual cease-fire on 22 
February 1991, internal rebellion broke out in southern and 
northern Iraq. The unrest during March and April in northern 
Iraq marked the beginning of the Kurdish rebellion and from 
then onwards the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq became a 
real concern for world public opinion and the UNSC, being 
recognised as a fresh threat to international peace and 
security.
1.1.1 Rebellion in Northern Iraq in the Aftermath of the
Gulf War
Following the cease-fire, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein 
offered his Shi'i and Kurdish opponents separate deals giving 
them a share in the central government in exchange for 
loyalty but leaders from both groups rejected the proposals.^ 
After that rejection, Saddam Hussein threatened his opponents 
with harsh measures including the dropping of napalm bombs. 
More rioting erupted in northern Iraq and, during 
demonstrations in Baghdad, demands were made for the 
resignation Saddam Hussein.
For some time, the Kurdish rebels were successful. 
According to analysts, Kurdish fighters took control of a 
large portion of northern Iraq^ while Hussein was preoccupied 
with the southern regions of the country. On 2 6 March, 
Iraqi and international sources agreed that the uprising in 
the south had been quelled.^ In the north, Kurdish forces 
held most of Iraqi Kurdistan and were moving to Kirkuk.'^ The 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani and other 
Kurdish leaders returned from exile to join the Kurdish 
guerilla forces fighting in the north.^
However, from these successes was born catastrophe for 
the Kurds as the Iraqi forces, having suppressed the 
rebellion in the south, switched their attention to the 
north. On 28 March 1991, Iraqi government forces launched a 
massive attack against Kurdish forces holding Kirkuk and 
Kurdish leader Talabani issued an urgent request to the 
Allie<^ Countries to send food aid to Kurdish held northern 
Iraq through Iran and Turkey as Iraqi troops had blocked food 
shipments from the south.^ On 31 March, Iraqi Prime Minister 
Sadun Hammadi asserted that the uprising in the north had 
been supressed and loyalist forces retaken Kirkuk, Dohuk and 
Erbil.*^ On 1 April 1991, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party in Iraq, Massud Barzani, reported that millions of 
Iraqi Kurds were fleeing into the mountains of northern Iraq 
to escape attacks by government forces.^ On 2 April 1991, it 
was reported that the Iraqi government used fixed-wing jets 
in defiance of the American ceasefire terms and employed 
chemical bombs and phosphorous shells to kill many Kurds.  ^ On
the same day, a Democratic Party of Kurdistan spokesman said 
that the Kurds were "facing a worse genocide than the one in 
Halabja". This was a reference to an attack by the Iraqi army 
in 1988 when poison gas was dropped on the town of Halabja 
and an estimated 5,000-6,000 people were k i l l e d . F e a r i n g  a 
similar attack, many civilian Kurds began to flee towards 
Turkish and Iranian borders and, on just 9 April, at least 
150 people reportedly died trying to cross the mined Turkish- 
Iraqi border.
The Turkish Government were in no position to handle a 
sudden influx of hundreds of thousands of people. Therefore, 
on 2 April it closed its borders citing the fact that there 
was a lack of both infra-structure and resources to cope with 
such a massive flood of r e f u g e e s . I t  was at this point that 
the Turkish president, Turgut Ozal, requested for 
international aid to provide shelter for these people, by way 
of a letter to UNSC. The letter stated that owing to the 
action taken by Iraqi army against the local population of 
northern Iraq, approximately 220,000 Iraqi citizens, many of 
them women and children, had massed along the Turkish border. 
It was obvious that the Iraqi Government forces were 
deliberately pressing these people towards the Turkish border 
in order to drive them out of the country. These actions 
violated all norms of international behaviour towards 
civilian populations and constituted a threat to regional 
peace and security. The letter went on to say that, "Turkey 
was taking appropriate action to bring urgent humanitarian 
assistance to the affected Iraqi civilians and it was
expected that the heavy burden of caring for those victims of 
repression would be shared by international organisations as 
well as by those countries in a position to assist. Moreover, 
Turkey requested that a meeting of the Security Council be 
held immediately to consider this alarming situation and to 
adopt the necessary measures to put an end to this inhuman 
repression being carried out on such a massive scale".
Following this appeal, many countries such as France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and United States began to 
share the burden. This resulted in Turkey reopening its 
southern borders on 4 April 1991.^^ UNDRO and UNHCR began to 
operate in the region in corporation with the International 
Red Cross and the Turkish Red Crescent. Offers of assistance 
also came from Czechoslovakia, Greece, Israel, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Austria, Australia, Romania and Soviet 
Union. Apart from Turkey, France also wanted the UN Security 
Council to convene in order to provide measures "against the 
brutality of the Iraqi Government against Kurds". However, 
until 5 April, the Bush Administration rejected the proposal 
citing the United States'"non-intervention policy" regarding 
Iraq’s internal affairs. But the reports of fleeing Kurds 
changed the attitude of the United States and Resolution 688 
was adopted by the UNSC on 5 April 1991.
1.1.2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 688
The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 688) 
was an emergency resolution and stated that a "grave concern
existed concerning the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently the 
Kurdish populated areas, which had led to a massive flow of 
refugees towards and across international frontiers. 
Furthermore, theses crossborder incursions were a threat to 
international peace and security in the region". The 
Resolution expressed "extreme [disquiet] at the magnitude of 
the human suffering involved". Quoting UNSCR 688, the UN 
Security Council firstly condemned the repression of the 
Iraqi civilians in the region and secondly, demanded Iraq 
that It should remove this threat to international peace and 
security in the region by immediately ending this 
repression". The UNSC also expressed "the hope in the same 
context that an open dialogue [would] take place to ensure 
that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens 
would be respected".
UNSCR 688 [insisted] that Iraq should allow immediate 
access by international humanitarian organizations to all 
those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make 
available all necessary facilities for their operations.The 
UN Secretary-General, was insructed through UNSCR 688 "to 
pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report 
forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission 
to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian
population, and in particular the Kurdish population,
suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by 
the Iraqi authorities" He was requested to use all the 
resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant
United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical 
needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population. At the 
end of Resolution 688, an appeal was made "to all member 
states and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to 
these humanitarian relief efforts" and a demand that Iraq 
should cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends.
All these statements showed that UNSC wanted to stop the 
repression against Iraqi Kurdish population and revealed its 
determination to solve this humanitarian problem, using all 
appropriate means. UNSCR 688 also stated that all these 
efforts should be performed under the accepted "committment 
of all member states to the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all 
states in the area."
1 .1.3. From Operation Provide Comfort I To Operation Provide
Comfort II
UNSCR 688 led to the initiation of an international 
humanitarian aid campaign, mostly overseen by the UNHCR in 
northern Iraq. The aim was to provide immediate humanitarian 
assistance to the Kurds but it became quickly evident that 
some kind of protective umbrella was needed to achieve this 
mission.From this time onwards the conditions for a 
"humanitarian intervention" arose. Because "the purpose of 
the humanitarian intervention was not the creation of a new 
state [in northern Iraq] but only the protection of human
rights [in that region] keeping the international law
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principle of-respect to the territories of the sovereign 
states by the threat or the use of international f o r c e . T h i s  
was also the reasoning behind the Resolution 688.
Within those lines, to prevent the unimpeded flow of 
international aid to northern Iraq, firstly the United 
States, initiated the humanitarian intervention and within 
the framework of UNSCR 688, warned Iraq on 6 April 1991 not 
to undertake any military action in northern Iraq.^^
Over the following days, Turkey and the EC-especially the 
United Kingdom-suggested the creation of ’’safe havens” in 
northern Iraq. In support of this suggestion the United 
States, on 10 April 1991, "issued an injunction against Iraq 
to cease all military activity north of the 36th parallel, 
encompassing an area bordered by a line to the north of the 
oil producing area around Kirkuk, reaching up to the border 
with Turkey. A White House spokesman indicated that the US 
had also warned Iraq that any military interference would be 
met with force".2°
The United States, for some time, had wanted a firm threat 
to be issued by the United Nations but, Perez De Cuellar, 
Secretary General at the time, rejected the proposal on the 
grounds that it would be against the principle of the Charter 
regarding non-intervention in the internal affairs of the 
independent states, favouring an "agreement of the Security 
C o u n c i l " O n  11 April 1991, President Bush announced the 
establishment of "informal safe havens" in northern Iraq from
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where aid would be disbursed to refugees. Bush warned Iraqi 
President against interfering with humanitarian aid efforts 
in any part of Iraq.^^ On 7 April 1991, the US military 
initiated "Operation Provide Comfort " (OPC) , a relief aid 
compaign in northern Iraq intended to provide food and 
temporary shelter for 700,000 refugees until other relief 
groups were able to take over the efforts.
Within 36 hours, in the first phase of OPC, US Air Force 
planes flew from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, dropping the 
first urgently needed supplies. On that first day OPC forces 
flew six air-drop missions, sending 32,000 pounds of food, 
water, clothing, tents, and blankets to the refugees. By day 
seven, this figure had grown to 1,707,000 pounds. Over the 
next few weeks, US Army, Navy, Marine and allied aircraft and 
personnel joined the relief e f f o r t s . T h e  Allied forces moved 
into northern Iraq on 17 April, following an announcement by 
Bush on 16 April reversing his administration's policy 
regarding non-intervention, committing American troops to set 
up encampments in northern Iraq to ensure the safety of 
Kurdish refugees and coordinate relief supplies.
This announcement by President Bush also contained a 
reassurance to the Kurds that adequate security would be 
provided at the temporary sites by American, British, and 
French air and ground forces, consistent with Resolution 
688.^^ The coalition forces established a security zone in 
northern Iraq, barring entry to Iraqi military and security 
forces and allowing the vast majority of refugees to return
fo
to their homes. The security zone, which still exists, 
measures approximately 160 miles wide by 50 miles deep.^^
Simultaneously, on 19 April, on the Turco-Iraqi border,the 
establishment of safe havens was negotiated with Iraqi 
officials. Following these developments, Iraq announced on 
25 April that it was withdrawing all but 50 of its security 
personnel from the allied safe haven around Zakho. The 
announcement followed an ultimatum issued by France, the
United Kingdom and the United States threatening the use of 
f o r c e . O n  16 April 1991, Bush stressed his intention to turn 
over the administration and security of these sites as soon 
as possible to the UN.^^ To this end, in late April 1991, a 
Military Coordination Center Team (MCC) was established to 
monitor conditions in northern Iraq, to confer with local 
authorities, and to ensure Iraqi military forces’ adherence 
to the coalition’s conditions to guarantee non-interference 
with humanitarian operations.
Today, the MCC is stationed in Zakho, Iraq, where
coalition military officers continue to coordinate with Iraqi 
military authorities, the efforts of the people of northern 
Iraq, the United Nations Agencies and private humanitarian 
agencies. On 13 May 1991, the United Nations took over the 
first temporary community near Zakho, and refugees began 
moving into this and other camps. By early June, virtually 
all the refugees had left Turkey and returned to Iraq.^^ The 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees assumed 
responsibility for relief efforts in the security zone in
I I
northern Iraq on 7 June 1 9 9 1 . However, the installation of 
UNHCR units in northern Iraq led to a fear of an Iraqi attack 
following the departure of the multinational forces that had 
participated in Operation Provide Comfort as only 236 UN 
soldiers replaced nearly 21,000 allied forces from 15 July 
onwards.
1.2. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT II
In July 1991, with the completion of withdrawal of UN 
forces from Iraq approaching, a deterrent force was needed 
for the protection of the civilians in the region. It was to 
be a small unit composed of 5,000 men with aircraft support, 
but its function was to be a "tripwire," meaning that any 
agressive intentions by the Iraqi army would be answered with 
a bigger response with American aircraft stationed on 
American aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea or the 
Gulf. It was to be a clear message to Saddam to stop at the 
36th parallel. Thus, Operation Provide Comfort II was 
conceived to replace OPC I. As its name suggests, it was 
still to be a humanitarian operation but a brigade-size rapid 
reaction force in southern Turkey would be on hand to quell 
the fears of the Kurds. But, still the plan had to be 
approved by the Turkish Government.
With OPC II, the mission officially changed from providing 
just relief to a deterrent against Iraqi encroachment into 
the security zone and a means to promote the stability and 
security of the people in northern Iraq.^^ Until the fall of
/2
1991, as the situation stabilized, a Combined Battalion Task 
Force made up of ground forces from six nations was held in 
readiness in Silopi, Turkey, just across the border from 
Iraq. Four nations were involved in the Combined Task Force 
whose mission was to deter possible Iraqi aggression by 
monitoring its compliance with the Security Council
resolutions and the 36th parallel no-fly zone.^^
OPC II was a multinational force and revealed the serious 
intentions of the participating states and reminded Iraq of 
"what might happen if it acted against the K u r d s . D o u g l a s  
Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary of the time,commenting on 
the message given by OPC,listed the four conditions of OPC II 
as,
- The Iraqis must be made to understand clearly that they 
risk military reprisals if they do not respect the rights of 
the Kurds,
- UN sanctions must be kept in place for the foreseeable 
future,
- The build up of UN guards to replace western-forces in 
Northern Iraq must continue at a faster pace,
- A satisfactory agreement between Baghdad and the Kurds 
guaranteeing Kurdish rights and security must be concluded.
OPC II was designed to be a long-term deterrent force. 
Although American air power in Turkey would remain the most 
potent deterrent ground force, possibly consisting of 
rotating American, British, French, Italian, and Dutch troops
Y3
stationed in southern Turkey, would be an additional 
deterrent.^® It was also stated by Paul Wolf owitz, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defence of the United States, that it 
would not be a "police force" to protect Western interests in
the region 39
Following negotiations with participating states that 
took place from mid-June to mid-July, OPC II's deterrent 
nature was approved by the Turkish Government as well. In a 
government press release, dated 24 July 1991, it was stated 
that the operation was named Operation Provide Comfort II. It 
was also stated that the action was based on Resolution 688 
(5 July 1994) and on the decision of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly granting the Government to decide on the 
deployment of foreign forces in Turkey dated 17 January 1991 
(Numbered 126), however, it was stressed that the presence in 
Turkey of the multinational force participating in the 
Operation Provide Comfort II would be temporary. The time 
limit was set as 30 September 1991 unless an extension was 
granted by the Turkish government.
The explanations concerning the force’s posture and aims 
of Operation Provide Comfort were stated as:
-· To deter Iragis from using force north of 36th paralel 
so that humanitarian aid could continue to be provided,
- Its co-commanders will be one Turkish and one American 
General,
- Its total force will be 5,000 , 2,000 of whom would be
support personnel,
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-Its ground forces will be stationed in Silopi and Batman 
and numbering 3,000 soldiers from the United States, France, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Turkey,
- Its air forces will be stationed in Incirlik and would
be composed of F-16, A-10, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft
totalling 48,
- Its support forces will be stationed on the [American] 
aircraft carrier Forrestal, patrolling in East Mediterranean,
-Its operational forces will be provided with personnel 
not numbering more than 1,500 to deal with helicopters and 
the maintenance of existing equipment.
1.3. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT IN EVOLUTION
Operation Provide Comfort II was successful in the period 
between July and September 1991 in deterring the Iraqi forces 
but the general situation in northern Iraq had still not 
become settled by the September deadline. Therefore, on 22 
September 1991, the Turkish Council of Ministers decided to 
extend the period of OPC II from 30 September 1991 to 30 
December 1991. The decision was basically identical to the 
one passed on 12 July 1991 but this time it included the 
proviso that -all allied ground troops and helicopters based 
on the Turkish border with Iraq were to be withdrawn within 
30 days. Only the air-strike force in Incirlik would continue 
to deter Iraqi agression against the Kurds.Simultaneously, 
American officials comfirmed that additional F-111 fighter 
and EF-111 reconnaissance aircraft would be deployed.
replacing the much slower A-10 warthog tank-busters.The total 
air-strike force would remain at 48 aircraft.
On 24 September 1991, the spokesman of the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that "deterrence would be 
provided through air power instead of ground f o r c e s . O n  20 
December 1991, the Council of Ministers for a second time, 
extended the period of Operation Provide Comfort II from the 
30 December 1991 to the 30 June 1992. On this occasion the 
Council of Ministers returned the grant of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly to the Council Of Ministers the right to 
decide on the deployment of foreign forces in Turkey. This 
decision, dated 17th January 1991 (Numbered 126) , gave the 
perogative to make such decisions back to the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly and is an indication of Turkish sensitivity 
towards the presence of "foreign forces" on Turkish soil.In 
fact, the government did not want to take the responsibility 
of extending Operation Provide Comfort II for a third time. 
Thus, when it came to a third extension, it was the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly instead of Council of Ministers who 
extended the period from the 30 June 1992 to the 30 December 
1992 .
This decision repeated that Operation Provide Comfort II 
would be used for deterrent purposes against Iraqi 
Government's use of force against Kurds as well as for the 
prevention of another refugee crisis and humanitarian 
catastrophe in northern Iraq. Decision 126, was taken with
1(>
reference to Resolution 688 and the decision of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TGNA) dated 17 January 1991.^^
With this decision, it was stressed that ground forces 
were not to be deployed in Turkey anymore. In a press release 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was stated that there 
were only 1831 personnel responsible for the support and 
maintenance services of the 48 allied aircraft (32 American,
8 French, 8 British) and 4 Turkish aircraft based in
incirlik. There were also 56 personnel stationed in Pirinçlik 
(Diyarbakir) and Zakho (Iraq) in order to monitor the daily 
developments in northern Iraq for the Military Coordination 
Committee. For transportation between Diyarbakir and Zakho 
there were 6 helicopters with at least one Turkish personnel 
aboard every flight.
The success of Operation Provide Comfort II in deterring 
Iraqis and continuing humanitarian aid to the Kurds led to 
the extension of the period by the TGNA an additional four 
times so far. The first extension was voted on 24 December 
1992 and lasted until 30 June 1993. The second was approved 
on 24 June 1993 and its validation was until 31 December 
1993. The third extension for another six months starting 
from 30 December 1993 was accepted by the TGNA on 28 
December 1991. The most recent extension was approved by the 
TGNA on 16 June 1994 . ( The decisions of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly regarding the Gulf crisis and Operation 
Provide Comfort II are available in the Appendix )
The last four extensions did not change the force posture 
of Operation Provide Comfort II. At present, the principal 
forces of deterrence are aircraft totalling 48 (F-111,
Mirage, Jaguar and EF-llls) . The main strategic defense force 
is still the American aircraft carrier Forrestal in Eastern 
Mediterranean.
When one examines the evolution of the OPC, it is clear 
that the ground forces occupied an important place in 
providing deterrence during the first phase of the operation 
but after October 1991 the main deterring factor was the 
flights over the safety zone to the north of the 36th 
parallel.From the beginning of OPC II, despite the change in 
its force posture, its humanitarian goal, as stipulated by 
UNSC Resolution 688, remained the prime objective.
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POINTS ON OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
There are different views and debates concerning OPC but 
they can be categorised according to two groups - those 
belonging to the government and those espoused by the 
opposition. The views of the former are evident from the 
decisions of the Council of Ministers and the decisions of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The perspectives of the 
opposition were spelled out during the debates prior to the 
TGNA decisions.Thus, to fully understand the range of views 
it is first necessary to study the texts of the Council of 
Ministers and TGNA decisions in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War.
2.1. POINTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE DEBATES FOR THE
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT “ %
2.1.1. Decision of the TGNA on 17 January 1991
C H A P T E R  I I
As would be expected, the views of the Government, 
formulated by the governing Motherland Party, centered on the 
points raised during the first TGNA debate on the stationing 
of "foreign forces" in Turkey.On 17 January 1991, the 
Motherland Party engineered the decision of the TGNA to 
permit the foreign troops to stay in Turkey under the grounds
of Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution and in accordance 
with UNSCR resolution 678. The principal aim was to protect 
the vital interests of Turkey, which were being threatened by 
the crisis, and pursue "an active foreign policy".^
During the debate prior to the approval of the 
Governmental decree, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet 
Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, summarised the developments that had led 
to the crisis and tried to explain the reasons for the 
deployment of the 48 aircraft in Turkey. He insisted that 
these forces were not to be used immediately but to be on 
hand as a precautionary measure.^  Minister of State, Kamran 
İnan repeated the views of his Government and insisted that 
Turkey’s aim was not to open a Second Front in the north. He 
re-iterated that all these steps had been taken to restore 
the rule of international law in the region.^ That same day. 
Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut reported that the decision 
represented a last resort to avoid war in the region. The 
TGNA, by this decision, authorized the Council of Ministers 
to implement its power and initiate the application phases of 
Operation Provide Comfort.
2.1.2. Decision of the Council Of Ministers on 24 July 1991
On 24 July 1991, the Decision of the Council of Ministers 
regarding OPC was released to the press. It repeated the 
views of the TGNA that had led to the decision being approved 
on 17 January 1991. The Council of Ministers' decision opened 
the way to Operation Provide Comfort II or "Poised Hammer" as
гг
it was dubbed by the Turkish press. The decision stressed 
that the aim was merely to provide humanitarian aid to 
northern Iraq, in fulfillment of the TGNA's 17 January 1991 
decision taken to accord with UNSCR 688. The press release 
repeated that the forces taking part in the operation would 
only stay in Turkey until 30 September.^
2 .1.3. Decision of the Council Of Ministers on 24 September
1991
The Council of Ministers' 24 July decision was based on 
the assumption that OPC II’s humanitarian mission would have 
been accomplished by 30 September deadline. However, by the 
time the deadline was reached the situation still had not 
changed so the 24 September decision was only different from 
its predecessor in as much as it mentioned the incompleted 
humanitarian aid operation's development.^
2.1.4. Decision of the Council Of Ministers on 20 December
1991
The following Council of Ministers decision was taken on 
20 December 1991 and once again extended the stay of foreign 
forces in Turkey. However it was amended by the addition of a 
condition stating that the right to authorize any further 
extension of operations by foreign forces in Turkey would 
pass from the Council of Ministers back to the TGNA. Thus, 
although the content of the decision was basically the same 
as the previous one, the new deadline was set as 30 June and
25
transferred any other extension right to the TGNA.^ This 
difference reflected pressures from opposition groups and 
parties who questioned the stated aims of Operation Provide 
Comfort.
2.1.5. Decision of the TGNA on 26 June 1992
It was the first decision passed by the ruling coalition 
of Prime Minister Demirel's True Path Party and İnönü's 
Social Democratic Populist Party. The declared aim of the 
coalition was to correct mistakes, including those concerning 
Operation Provide Comfort, made by the previous government. 
Yet in fact they acted in line with previous policies in 
contradiction to their program.
During the TGNA debate of 2 6 June 1992 regarding a six 
month extension of Operation Provide Comfort, the Coalition 
Government upheld the policies of the previous goverment. The 
Governmental proposal submitted to the TGNA for approval 
reiterated that the aim of the Operation Provide Comfort was 
to prevent and to deter the threats that emerged just after 
the Gulf War. The possible dangers that could threaten 
Turkey's physical,economic and social security were pointed 
out and cited as a reason why it was necessary permit a 
further six month extension. The same government proposal 
also declared the status of the deterrent forces and the 
contribution of the Turkish Armed Forces would be decided by 
the Council of Ministers and kept strictly secret. The 
decision was based on the same grounds as previous ones: 
UNSCR 688 and Article 92 of the Constitution of Turkey.'^
During the debate, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet 
Çetin recounted the history of Operation Provide Comfort and 
gave information about the force's posture and its aims.He 
also stressed that these forces were only to be stationed in 
Turkey temporarily. Therefore, they were not be looked upon 
as foreign forces providing Western support for a de-facto 
Kurdish state. Hikmet Çetin, in his address to the TGNA, 
added that the extraordinary situation in northern Iraq was 
continuing and there remained a threat of an attack by the 
170,000 Iraqi soldiers (about 18 brigades) just below the 
36th parallel. He also refuted the accusation that the action 
represented an incursion against "the integrity of Iraq" 
saying that not only Turkey but also the United States and 
other allies had repeatedly confirmed that the principles of 
law relating to respect for the integrity of independent 
states still applied and related also to Iraq. He said that 
the elections in Iraq could not be considered as an 
indication of a normal democratic process but as the sole 
means to prevent chaos in a region where all authority had 
been temporarily lost.He did not forget to mention that 
Operation Provide Comfort II was taking place under the 
scrunity of a Turkish co-commander, thus eliminating the 
suspicion that the OPC was not controlled by the Turkişih 
side.®
On the question as "to what extent these small forces 
would deter 18 brigades of Iraqi Army and replace the Turkish 
Armed Forces stationed in the region", Ali Dinçer, from the
Social Democratic Populist Party emphasized that the actual 
extent of deterrence implied was unrelated to the size of the 
military force as its multinational nature was an additional 
deterring factor on its own.  ^ After the debate, the 
Government decree was approved by the TGNA and thus Operation 
Provide Comfort II was extended for another six months, 
ending 30 December 1992.
2.1.6. Decision of the TGNA on 24 December 1992
The final proposal brought before the TGNA for voting was 
exactly the same as its predecessor approved on 26 June 1992 
in as much as it requested a further six month extension. 
Even the wording of the proposal was the same and during the 
debate Minister Çetin found himself answering the same 
questions as he had answered six months before. He added that 
Turkey had no desire to become an enemy of Iraq and that 
sharing the responsibility with a multinational force negated 
the "image of Turkey as an enemy" in the eyes of Iraqi public
opinion.
On the point whether the Operation Provide Comfort forces 
known as the Combined Task Force were helping the PKK, he 
emphasized that all the flights in the region were controlled 
by Turkish staff who would immediately detect such a 
situation if it should arise. Çetin also reported that the 
deterrence force would be given a six months extension but if 
the situation should normalize there would be no further 
extension. But, he continued, as the situation in northern
76
Iraq had so far remained critical, there was a necessity for 
the deployment of the forces in Turkey for the immediate
future.10
Aydin Güven Gürkan, speaking for the Social Democratic 
Populist Party Group, supported the government's views and 
added that Syria, Iran and other regional states had, like 
Turkey, declared their respect for the integrity of Iraq. He 
said that Operation Provide Comfort, as its name implied, was 
a humanitarian mission performed in accordance with UNSCR 688 
and represented the optimum choice. He supported the view 
that, if Turkey played its cards right, support for the 
motion would be in Turkey's national interests.
2.1.7. Decision of the TGNA on 24 June 1993
The government's decree extended Operation Provide Comfort 
an additional six months until 30 December 1993 and was 
identical to the previous one. The related questions from the 
TGNA members were also very similar but this time the 
government was less forthcoming with its answers. A point 
made was that , despite all intentions to the contrary, the 
forces were still stationed in Turkey and the Iraqi forces 
were still poised just below the 36th parallel and 
threatening a massacre. Therefore, although the situation was 
very different from that which had existed in 1991, there was 
still a clear need for a deterrent force to prevent a 
catastrophe. Cemal Şahin, speaking for the Social Democratic 
Populist Party, made little effort to allay the suspicions
2 ?
concerning OPC II, dwelling more on the effectiveness of the 
operation, providing peace and stability in the region and in 
deterring Iraqi forces.
2.1.8. Decision of the TGNA on 28 December 1993 and on 14
June 1994
Hikmet Çetin, as Foreign Minister, repeated the views of 
his government as he had in previous parliamentary debates on 
OPC II.The Turkish government of the day continued to 
perceive a need for OPC II and submitted proposals that were 
voted upon and legislated on 28 December 1993 and again on 
14 June 1994.14
2.2. POINTS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AND THE DEBATES ON 
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
The following section of this thesis contrasts the views 
of the opposition parties aired in the TGNA between 1991 and 
1994. In particular, it examines the views of the Motherland 
Party, the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Populist 
Party both in and out of office. This section of the thesis 
also attempts to explain why certain suspicions arose 
concerning the true of Operation Provide Comfort and the re­
alignment of allegiances in Turkish politics.
2.2.1. Motherland Party
It was the Motherland Party, the ruling party in 1991, 
that first accepted the stationing of foreign forces within 
the framework of UNSCR 688 and on the basis of Article 92 of 
the Turkish Constitution. In time, their perspective evolved 
to the point where they began to stress that the aims of the 
Operation Provide Comfort had greatly changed. According to 
the Motherland Party, the aim of the Operation had been 
transformed from being solely humanitarian to the
establishment of a puppet regime in northern Iraq by Western 
states. This, it was claimed, revealed that there had also 
been a strategic aim - to protect oil areas from Saddam. 
Thus, the Motherland Party, the main opposition grouping, 
insisted, as a prerequisite for their support, that more 
controls on the Operation should be imposed and that the 
government should take a more active stance in foreign 
affairs. During the parliamentary debate on the government’s 
proposal brought before the TGNA on 24 December 1992, Safa 
Giray, speaking for the Motherland Party Group, reminded the 
Coalition Government of their previous views on "expelling 
the foreign force" from Turkey. He said that the True Path 
Party and Social Democratic Populist Party had, whilst in 
opposition, had rejected the views of the Motherland Party 
because they had perceived them as a threat to Turkey's 
national interests, dragging Turkey into the Gulf War and 
creating a second front. Giray also reminded them of their 
changing views regarding the operation’s humanitarian aims. 
He said that only three states. United Kingdom, France and
the United States - the mandate states of the past in the 
region , instead of the original 13 nations of the
humanitarian aid operation, were still participating, which 
demonstrated their unchanged ambitions for the region.On that 
occasion the proposal was passed but included the provision 
that if the operation continued it would have to be under 
strict Turkish control.
During the parliamentary debate on the extension of the 
period of Operation Provide Comfort that took place on 24 
June 1993, Kamran İnan, addressing the TGNA on behalf of the 
Motherland Party Group, repeated the previous views of his 
party but went on to say that new factors had emerged 
concerning the status of the Operation Provide Comfort. One 
of these factors was the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the changing structure of international politics in the 
region.Another factor was the use of the Operation Provide 
Comfort to pursue aims outside its original brief such as the 
bombing of Iraq. He added that the actions of the Operation 
Provide Comfort participants could not be controlled 
effectively by the Government. Therefore a dynamic foreign 
policy would have to be applied in relation to Operation 
Provide Comfort to pursue the best national interests of 
Turkey. He concluded by emphasizing that all measures should 
be taken to ensure that Operation Provide Comfort followed
strictly legal guidelines 17
In the parliamentary debate on 28 December 1993, Engin 
Guner speaking for his party group repeated the previous
views of his party and added that OPC II has become a source 
of suspicion as it had been used in the past as a tool for 
the creation of a Kurdish state in the region. Therefore, the 
developments had to be communicated to the public by the 
government. He also wanted an extension of only three months 
instead of six.^^
2.2.2. True Path Party
Before coming to power as the major partner of a coalition 
government, the True Path Party had been absolutely opposed 
the stationing of foreign forces in Turkey, perceiving them 
to as a means by which a second front might be opened against 
Iraq during the Gulf War. During the Parliamentary debate on 
17 January 1991, Süleyman Demirel, speaking for his party 
group, asked for the real reason for the stationing of 48 
aircraft in Turkey. But later on, when the True Path Party 
came to power, they began to support the Operation Provide
Comfort.
2.2.3. Social Democratic Populist Party
Just like its coalition partner, the Social Democratic 
Populist Party had also been firmly against the deployment of 
foreign forces in Turkey before coming to the power. They had 
seen Operation Provide Comfort as a violation of the national 
interests of Turkey. Erdal İnönü, speaking to the TGNA on the 
behalf of his party group on 17 January 1991, said that they 
were against these forces because they regarded them as a
means by which Turkey would be drawn into the Gulf War.^^ But 
their views also changed dramatically when they became a 
coalition partner of the government.
2.2.4. Welfare Party
The Islamic fundamentalist Welfare Party had criticized 
the idea of deploying foreign forces in Turkey for any reason 
right from the very beginning of Operation Provide Comfort. 
In the parliamentary debate on 26 June 1992^ the Welfare 
Party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, addressing the TGNA for his 
party group, described Operation Provide Comfort forces as an 
occupying army. He went even further, claiming that these 
forces were actively assisting the PKK. He also condemned 
Demirel and İnönü for changing their views after coming to 
power. He said that the Americans had deliberately forced 
the Kurds to flee from northern Iraq in order to create a 
reason for the revival of the Treaty of Sevres is signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied States of the First 
World War in 1919. He totally rejected the deterrent 
character of Operation Provide C o m f o r t . I n  his speech 
criticizing Operation Provide Comfort, Erbakan, in accordance 
with his pro-Islamic views, suggested the replacement of
American personnel with an islamic force. 22
On 24 December 1992, Adbullah Gül, speaking for his Party 
Group in the TGNA, repeated his Party's understanding of the 
Treaty of Sevres and insisted that Operation Provide Comfort 
was helping not only the PKK but also the Armenians. He said
that the forces involved in this Operation were being used to 
create a de-facto Kurdish state on the borders of T u r k e y .^3
During the TGNA debate on 24 June 1993 Şevket Kazan took a 
more pragmatic stance.He summarized the conditions and 
reasons for the deployment of Operation Provide Comfort and 
criticized the changing views of the True Path Party and the 
Social Democratic Populist Party. He claimed that the 
Operation was without any legal basis as, in his opinion,
there was no threat coming from northern Iraq. On the 
contrary, it was his belief that if there was a threat it was 
from the Americans towards the territorial integrity of 
Turkey. On 28 December 1993, Abdullah Gül repeated his
party's views and continued to say that OPC II was a "strange 
development"in Turkish Politics.
2.2.5. Democratic Left Party
As the second biggest leftist party, Bülent Ecevit's 
Democratic Left Party consistently opposed OPC, not only 
criticizing the Operation but also putting forward policy 
recommendations ,Bülent Ecevit had from the earliest debates 
concerning Operation Provide Comfort, pointed out that the 
countries who had contributed the foreign forces in the 
region were the same as those who had once ruled the region 
by mandate after World War I and their true aim was to create
the conditions that would lead to the renewal of the Treaty
of Sevres. He claimed that, as a result, a new Kurdish State 
would be established in northern Iraq in the near f u t u r e . H e
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also cited the strategic importance of Iraq and its oil 
reserves saying this was the main reason for the deployment 
of foreign forces in Turkey. Therefore he considered the 
forces stationed in Turkey as contrary to Turkey's national 
interests and would amount to suicide should a Kurdish state 
be established. In his opinion, the loss of authority in 
Northern Iraq caused by Operation Provide Comfort was the 
major reason for the increasing frequency of clashes between 
the PKK and the Turkish Armed forces. Ecevit also suggested 
the expulsion of these forces from Turkey to be replaced with 
a control mechanism established by Turkey. He concluded by 
requesting that Turkey should re-establish diplomatic
contacts with Iraq. 27
In the parliamentary debate of 26 June 1992, he again 
supported the view that the authority void in northern Iraq 
was the main reason for the increasing number of PKK attacks 
over the past years. He added that Turkish foreign policy was 
so tied to American foreign policy that Turkey could not do 
anything to further its own national interests. Therefore, 
for Ecevit, Turkey was being used to help create a Kurdish 
state in the region. He also warned the Government to protect 
the Turkmens in the region along with the Kurds and t^ . re- 
tablish diplomatic links with Iraq immediately.28es
On 24 December 1992, Ecevit repeated his Party's views to 
the TGNA and added that all the events leading up to 
Operation Provide Comfort were part of a greater scenario 
designed by the Americans, the British and the French in
accordance with their national interests. He rejected the 
excuse of the Government that the aim of the Western powers 
was to guarantee the terrotorial integrity of Iraq on the 
grounds that in effect a de-facto Kurdish state had been 
established in the region.
On 24 June 1993, during a parliamentary debate, Ecevit 
reported that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan had confirmed that 
the existing situation in northern Iraq had helped them 
expand and grow. Therefore, he insisted that for Turkey's 
foreign policy should accord with the country's best 
interests and that Turkey had to expel the foreign forces and 
reestablish diplomatic ties with Iraq.^^ On 28 December 1993, 
Ecevit repeated his known views on OPC II and added that 
Turkey was committing suicide by letting these forces be 
stationed on its soil.^^
2.2.6. Republican People's Party
Another leftist party which had remained consistent and 
realistic in its views, was the Republican People's Party 
(RPP) . Deniz Baykal, the leader of the RPP, stated that 
another deterrerence mechanism was required to take the pl4ce 
of Operation Provide Comfort. He said that, except for 
Turkey, the existing forces were just being used to further 
the national interests of the participating states.He 
proposed the establishment of a mechanism that would combine 
with the internal mechanisms of the states of the region and 
added that Turkey's forces were sufficient to control the
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situation.32 On 24 December 1992, Ulu9 Gurkan, speaking on the 
behalf of his party, evaluated in an address to the TGNA the 
changing conditions in the region. He said that initially the 
motive of the operation had just been humanitarian and thus 
the deterrent effect of the operation was justifiable but 
this situatxon no longer existed. Thus, he continued, the 
main question to be answered was what was the true aim of 
Operation Provide Comfort and why just the forces from the 
former mandate powers of the region were involved instead of 
the 13 nations that had originally participated. He 
emphasized that Operation Provide Comfort II rather than OPC 
I had served the interests of the three major states 
influential in the region with the creation of a Kurdish 
state He added that since there was a clear authority void 
in northern Iraq, Turkey was not in a position to handle all 
the problems existing in the region and with each development 
the situation was slipping further out of Turkey's control. 
Gurkan, also repeated that the stationing of these forces had 
not only fostered the climate that had led to the creation of 
a Kurdish state but had also encouraged a situation whereby 
the frequency of PKK attacks had increased. He criticized the 
existence of these forces saying they were an obstacle 
between Turkey and Iraq. Gurkan added that since the presence 
of these forces was illegal, their expulsion would serve
Turkey's best national interests 33
On 24 June 1993, Ulug Gurkan spoke again on the behalf of 
his party, repeating these views and giving an evaluation of 
Turkish foreign policy. With regard to this issue, he
emphasized that the dependence of Turkish foreign policy on 
Western powers was an indication of the weak and powerless 
situation of Turkey. For him, in order to establish an 
independent Turkish foreign policy, Turkey had to step 
forward in accordance with its own national interests, not 
only with regard to northern Iraq but also in relation to the 
Caucausus and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2.2.7. Nationalist Movement Party
Alpaslan Turkey's Nationalist Movement Party was one of 
the opposition groups usually considered to possess more 
realistic views. But contrary to Erbakan, Turkey supported 
the views for OPC. But he also added the view that the 
events which had taken place in the aftermath of the Gulf War 
were just parts of a scenario. In his opinion, Turkey could 
not defend its own interests against the major powers of the 
world. Turkey, firstly had to construct its own foreign 
policy and later on should take back Kirkuk, an oil rich 
region stolen from Turkey in the aftermath of the First World
War.35
2.2.8. People's Labour Party
The predominantly Kurdish ,People's Labour Party, once 
banned by the court, remained neutral to Operation Provide 
Comfort but implicitly supported the stationing of foreign 
forces in Turkey. However, they generally accepted the view 
that these forces were in reality pursing their own national
interests. On the other hand, Ahmet Türk, the leader of the 
People's Labour Party, maintained that the existence of these 
forces in the region did not automatically mean the 
establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. He added 
that the underlying issue was not Operation Provide Comfort 
but the establishment of friendship between the Kurds and the 
Turks who had been living peacefully together in the Middle
East for hundreds of years 36
2.3. POINTS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Following the initiation of Operation Provide Comfort, on 
24 July 1991, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
declared its official views on OPC. As can be seen, the views 
reflect the Government's opinions and parliamentary debates 
on OPC. The first official declaration was worded as
"the principal aim of OPC will be to prevent the inflow of 
refugees into Turkey again and to force Iraq to obey the UN 
Resolutions on this matter."
The main points concerning OPC were listed as below:
- An international force consisting of land and air forces 
would be deployed in Turkey temporarily,
- Turkey will participate with this force which will be 
co-commanded by an American and a Turkish commander. The two 
commanders will have the same status, consult each other and 
act in coordination.^'^
In the same declaration ’’the principles of implementation" 
were noted as
The Force can not use Turkish land and airspace for any 
aggressive attack against Iraq without prior permission from 
the Turkish Government. This rule will be valid for the US 
naval force in the Mediterranean Sea, held as a support force 
for OPC,
- The numbers and locations of the participating forces 
will be decided in coordination with the Turkish General
Staff,
The decrees and regulations for the transport, 
implementation and stationing of OPC forces will be 
determined by the Turkish General Staff in line with Turkish 
regulations and laws,
- All claims to immunity of OPC personnel would be 
dependent upon prior permission from, the Turkish Government,
- The stay of OPC forces in Turkey will be temporary and 
the extent of the limit would be dependent on the wishes of 
the Turkish Government
This declaration reveals that the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was "for" the stationing of OPC as long as 
the circumstances in Iraq remained critical.The declaration 
stated that "the Turkish authorities dealing with this matter 
via the Foreign Ministry consider that the principal aims are 
to provide defence against prospective Iraqi aggression and 
to continue the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to 
northern Iraq."
P
It was perceived by the Turkish Foreign Ministry that an 
international force was both necessary and acceptance of such 
a force showed Turkey in a positive light in the eyes of 
world public opinion. Despite the fact that Turkey was 
manifestly unable to cope with the problems of the region on 
its own, because of the clear humanitarian nature of the OPC 
mission, Turkey’s compliance created a favourable impression 
all over the world.
The said declaration pointed out that since the force was 
to be controlled by the Turkish General Staff, there was no 
problem in their being stationed in Turkey. The authorities 
did not deny that the presence of the foreign forces could 
possibly be against the interests of Turkey but felt that 
such a situation was acceptable as long as long as Turkey 
kept control. During the debate on 'Mandatory Powers in the 
region', the Ministry officials stated that it was necessary 
to involve Turkey in such an international operation to match 
the spirit of the emerging New World Order. It was felt that 
without co-operation with the major states, no single country 
could deal alone with inter-territorial problems.
In short, as long as Allied forces acted within the 
framework of Resolution 688 and was under the control of the 
Turkish General Staff, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs did not oppose OPC. These views are repeated in 
various forms in all the reports of the Ministry and were 
explicitly spelled out by the government prior to the 
extension of the duration of Operation Provide Comfort.
Generally repeating the same views expressed earlier, the 
declaration concluded that "as long as the current 
circumstances continue in Iraq, the OPC should stay in 
Turkey."
Regarding the question as to whether such a small 
multinational force could provide sufficient deterrence in 
the region, the view of the Ministry was that it was the 
message of implicit international support rather than the 
number of personnel that offered the best deterrence against 
Iraq. It was considered that the fact that behind the small 
forces involved in OPC II stood the whole Turkish army, the 
USA, the UK and France, all ready to punish any violation of 
UNSCR 688 by Iraq, would be an added deterrence. The Gulf War 
had revealed that the technology of the OPC forces was so 
superior to that of Iraq that the Iraqis would desist from 
trying to take advantage of their numerical supremacy. It was 
further understood that the aim of OPC II was not to replace 
the Turkish Armed Forces stationed in the south-eastern 
region of Turkey.The number of Iraqi's just below the 36th 
parallel was approximately the same as the Turkish troops in 
the region but through OPC II, Turkey was able to secure the 
region without actual fighting and at the least cost. The 
participating states shared this view, considering the 
absence of actual warfare as the most suitable situation to 
achieve the humanitarian goals of OPC II.The Turkish Foreign 
Ministry also expressed the view that OPC II not only 
contributed to Turkish security but also was the best means 
for Turkey to co-operate with the participating states. It
¥
was clear that such an alliance greatly increased strategic 
cooperation between Turkey and the United States.
2.4■ POINTS OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
From 1991 onwards, the Turkish General Staff always 
perceived OPC as a political issue and one to be decided by 
politicians rather than by soldiers. Especially during the 
first days of the OPC, when the status and the functions of 
the force were undetermined, there were some suspicions 
amongst the Turkish General Staff but, as the "principles of 
implementation" became clear, these suspicions disappered.
On 26 July 1991, the Turkish General Staff stated in press 
release that the Turkish Government and the Turkish General 
would retain full control of OPC. Thus, when the 
controversy over whether the OPC forces were helping the PKK 
erupted on 28 October 1991, the Turkish General Staff 
announced that such a situation was out of question as every 
action of OPC was monitored and controlled by Turkish
officials.40
Despite this, there was much speculation in the Turkish 
press that the Turkish General Staff resented the failure of 
the United States to provide reconnaissance reports and 
intelligence to the Turkish Army concerning the PKK in the 
r e g i o n . I n  fact, the Turkish General Staff considered the 
whole operation as a political matter and had declared that 
their job was to implement political decisions, not to
2^.
criticize them. It can be said that the Turkish General Staff 
preferred to express its views in the National Security 
Council and thus effected Governmental views which are 
supporture of the OPC.
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AN EVALUATION OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
The events that took place in northern Iraq between 1991 
and 1994 and their relationship with the OPC forced the 
implementation of this humanitarian operation to be split 
into two phases. The first aim of OPC I was to provide
emergency aid to the people fleeing from northern Iraq to
Turkey; OPC II was to provide security in northern Iraq in 
order that these people could later return to their homes. 
Such an operation was deemed necessary because the flow of
hundreds of thousands of people endangered the security of
Turkey in terms of strategic, sociological and economic 
considerations.
C H A P T E R  I I I
To sum up, the refugee crisis was so severe that it was 
impossible for Turkey to cope with the problem alone and 
therefore UNSCR 688 was adopted and implemented by the UN, 
its agencies and the Allied forces. When the necessity for an 
organized operation became clear. Operation Provide Comfort 
was planned and an appeal was issued to the world community 
to participate in the operation. Following this, 13 nations 
responded and volunteered to realise this humanitarian 
mission. Once the security of northern Iraq had been re­
established and the refugees had returned to their homes, the 
mission came to an end but then the possibility arose of
’’another refugee crisis” if Iraq was left without control. 
Therefore the second phase of the Operation was initiated. 
Operation Provide Comfort II aimed at the continuation of 
humanitarian aid to the region and at deterring the Iraqi 
forces from repeating earlier aggresions. This changed the 
profile of OPC II from being primarily humanitarian to 
deterrence. It is obvious that the changing international 
circumstances in the region changed the objectives of the 
participating states and that these changes caused 
controversy against OPC within the field of Turkish politics. 
In fact, from the very beginning, the legal status of OPC and 
its ’’hidden purpose” had aroused much suspicion in Turkey.
Was OPC a scenario created by the ex-mandatory powers of 
the region in order to create a semi-independent Kurdish 
state to be used for the protection of Gulf oil by the major 
powers? Was it in the interests of Turkey to let these forces 
stay on its land or was it suicidal for Turkey especially 
considering the PKK and the Armenian relationship-an illusion 
put forward by the Welfare Party? Was there a real threat to 
Turkey from Iraq and to what extent did Turkey need an 
international force to cope with such a threat?
There exist numerous questions of this nature but in this 
dissertation only the data and references have been given to 
help in understanding and act as a guide towards analytic 
thinking.In general, it can be stated that the deployment of 
OPC was in Turkey's best interests as the aim of these forces 
was not to create a Kurdish state in the region but to
provide stability in the region and deter Iraq from forcing 
Kurdish civilians from flooding into Turkey. This was vital 
because the demographic and economic structure of the region 
meant that Turkey could not cope with such a massive crisis 
alone.
Thus, the intention of Turkey right from beginning was to 
protect its interests by retaining control of OPC. During the 
July 1991 negotiations that led to the creation of the OPC, 
the "principles of implementation" adopted by the Turkish 
Government had been carefully prepared to fit with UNSC 
Resolution 688 which had been originally a Turkish intiative 
anyway. Being permanent members of UNSC and of NATO, the 
inclusion of the United States, France and United Kingdom as 
participants in OPC was to be expected and unrelated to their 
one time role as mandatory powers.
The Turkish government was well aware that many question 
would arise during the creation phase of OPC and, in 
particular, that there would be great controversy surrounding 
the idea of stationing foreign forces in Turkey. It had been 
obvious that they would face difficulty in obtaining 
extension decrees from the TGNA. In fact, every political 
party in Turkey was aware that OPC under the "principles of 
implementation", applied by the Turkish General Staff and 
that these forces could not act without permission of Turkey. 
Nonetheless, the opposition groupings exploited the situation 
to extract maximum political advantage. Examples of this were 
the questions raised by the Welfare Party and Democratic Left
Party relating to the renewal of the Treaty of Sevres. The 
politicians of these parties knew well that Turkey was not 
on the verge of being partitioned yet still they used the 
situation to play their political cards. This also explains 
why the SDPP and TPP changed their views on OPC immediately 
after assuming power and why the Motherland Party performed a 
similar volte face. For the latter parties especially , the 
lack of information when they are in opposition caused in 
their being against the OPC together with popular policies 
that can exploit the feelings of the Turks.But when they came 
to power they quickly changed their views under as they get 
better informed.
Following the deployment of OPC forces, elections held in 
northern Iraq gave birth to possibility of an independent 
Kurdish state. Even then, it was thought that such an 
election might help reduce chaos in the region. Without 
elected leaders there would have been no one to deal with 
when it came to dividing up the supplies and aid brought to 
the region. To some extent it was true that for a while PKK 
guerillas were able to act freely amidst such chaos. But, 
following the elections, and after authority had been 
restored, the PKK were forced to live in camps that were 
targeted by Turkish armed forces in 1993 and in 1994 several 
times.
Looking from the perspective of power politics, the 
creation of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq and the deployment 
of OPC increased Turkey's geo-strategic influence in the
region. Especially the United States, the only superpower in 
the post-Cold War era, looking for stability not only in this 
region but globally, realized the geo-strategic importance of 
Turkey, said to have disappeared after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the Bipolar political structure.
At present, the rift between the United States and 
Britain and France is another factor that may boost the 
importance of Turkey in the region as the only stable 
democratic country. The wars of the future are likely to be 
local, based mostly on ethnic problems.The Balkans, 
Caucausus, and the Middle East having become the most 
sensitive regions in the new era Turkey as an important actor 
involved in such newly emerged problems e.g. Karabakh, Bosnia 
and northern Iraq seems to offer cooperation with the major 
states, especially with the United States so as to handle the 
burden jointly. Therefore OPC has been a good experience for 
Turkey in the humanitarian-strategic cooperation with the 
United States in particular.
Dependent on Turkey in many respects, the northern Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders have had to act in line with Turkey's overall 
interests. It was the Turkish army, whose power increased in 
the region to the extent that, particularly in 1994, that 
were able to circumscribe and limit the activities of the PKK 
in northern Iraq. By allowing the OPC forces to be stationed 
in the country and by cooperating with the participating 
states, Turkey's strategic power clearly grew. Also, the 
professed humanitarian aim of OPC cast Turkey in a positive
light in the eyes of world public opinion. The Kurdish 
leaders repeatedly expressed their gratitude to Turkey for 
providing a wide range of supplies ranging from energy and 
chemicals which was an invaluable source of positive 
propaganda for Turkey.
To sum up, it can be said that OPC was and remains in the 
general interest of Turkey and the pros derived from this 
position far outweigh the cons. Under the New World Order, 
that emerged following the liberation of the oppressed 
nations of the Eastern Bloc, Operation Provide Comfort II 
provides an excellent example of nations coordinating their 
policies to fight against repression and cruelty. It is in 
this light that Turkey’s initiation of such an operation 
should be appraised and appreciated.
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APPENDIX I
61
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
RELATING TO THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT
Rela ting , inter alio, to the Council's condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
A d op ted  by a vote of 14 in favour and 0 against. One member, Yemen, did not par­
ticipate in the vote.
Sp o n so rs : Canada, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia, United 
Kingdom, United States.
RESOLUTION 6450  2  August 1 9 9 0
RESOLUTION 661 6  A u g u s t  1 9 9 0
Rela ting , infer alia, to the imposition of mandatory sanctions and to the establishment of 
a Committee to undertake certain tasks regarding the implementation of the resolution. 
A d op ted  by a vote of 13 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen). 
Sponsors: Canada, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia, United 
Kingdom, United States, Zaire.
RESOLUTION 66a  9  A u g u s t  1 9 9 0
Relating , infer alia, to the non-validity of the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. 
A dop ted  by unanimous vote.
P repared  in the course of the Council's consultations.
RESOLUTION 664 1 8  A u g u s t  1 9 9 0
Relating , infer alia, to the nationals of third countries in Iraq and Kuwait and to 
diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.
A dop ted  by unanimous vote.
P repared  in the course of the Council's consultations.
RESOLUTION 665 2 5  A u g u s t  1 9 9 0
Relating , infer alio, to measures to ensure implementation of resolution 661.
A dop ted  by a vote of 13 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen). 
Sp on so rs : Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Finland, France, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.
RESOLUTION 666 1 3  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 0
Rela ting , infer alia, to the determination of humanitarian circumstances.
A d op ted  by a vote of 13 in favour and 2 against (Cuba and Yemen).
Sp o n so rs : Canada, Finland, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
RESOLUTION 66T 1 6  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 0
Rela ting , infer alia, to diplomatic and consular personnel and premises. 
A dop ted  by unanimous vote.
Sponsors: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Zaire.
Rela ting , infer alio, to requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the 
Charter.
A d op ted  by unanimous vote.
P rep a red  in the course of the Council's consultations.
RESOLUTION «69 24 September 1990
RESOLUTION «TO 2 5  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 0
Rela ting , infer alia, to the applicability of sanctions to all means of transport, including 
aircraft. Thirteen of the 15 members of the Council were represented by their Foreign 
Ministers at the meeting during which this resolution was adopted.
A d op ted  by a vote of 14 in favour and 1 against (Cuba).
Sp on so rs : Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Finland, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom, United States, Zaire.
RESOLUTION « T A  2 9  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 0
Rela ting , infer alia, to the situation of Kuwaiti and third-State nationals in Kuwait and 
Iraq, to further measures in the event of non-compliance by Iraq with Security Council 
resolutions and to the good offices of the Secretary-General.
A d o p ted  by a vote of 13 in favour, 0 against and 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen). 
Sponsors: Canada, Finland, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United 
States, Zaire.
RESOLUTION «TT  2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 0
Rela ting , infer alia, to attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the 
population of Kuwait.
Adopted by unanimous vote.
Sponsors; Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, Kuwait, Romania, United Kingdom, Zaire.
RESOLUTION «TB 2 9  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 0
Relating , infer alia, to the use by Member States of "all necessary means to uphold and 
implement [Security Council] resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolu­
tions and to restore international peace and security in the area". Thirteen of the 15 
members of the Council were represented by their Foreign Ministers at the meeting dur­
ing which this resolution was adopted.
A d o p ted  by a vote of 12 in favour, 2 against (Cuba and Yemen) and 1 abstention 
(China).
Sp o n so rs : Canada, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
RESOLUTION «8« 2  M a r c h  1 9 9 1
Relating , infer alia, to the suspension of offensive combat operations and to the importance 
of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities. 
A d op ted  by a vote of 11 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 3 abstentions (China, India, Yemen). 
Sp o n so rs : Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.
*1^
RESOLUTION 6 8 7 3 April 1991
Relating , infer alio, to the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and ter­
ritorial integrity and the return of its legitimate government, to the status of sanctions 
and to the setting of specific conditions for a formal cease-fire.
A dop ted  by a vote of 12 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 2 abstentions (Ecuador, Yemen). 
Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.
RESOLUTION 689 9  A p r i l  1 9 9 1
Relating  to the establishment of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
(UNIKOM).
A dopted  by unanimous vote.
P repared  in the course of the Council's consultations
RESOLUTION 6 9 3 S  2 0  M a y  1 9 9 1
Relating , inter alio, to the establishment of the United Nations Compensation Fund and 
the Commission to administer the Fund.
A dopted  by a vote of 14 in favour, 0 against and 1 abstention (Cuba).
Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire.
r e s o l u t i o n  699 1 7  J u n e  1 9 9 1
Relating, inter alia, to the disposal of weapons, facilities and all other items specified in 
section C of resolution 687 (1991).
A dopted  by unanimous vote.
Sponsors; France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
r e s o l u t i o n  700 1 7  J u n e  1 9 9 1
Relating, inter alio, to the approval of the guidelines to facilitate full international im­
plementation of the arms embargo against Iraq.
Adopted by unanimous vote.
Sponsors; Belgium, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
RESOLUTION 7 0 5  1 5  A u g u s t  1 9 9 1
Relating , inter olio, to the Council's decision that compensation to be paid by Iraq (as 
arising from section E of resolution 687) shall not exceed 30 per cent of the annual 
value of its exports of petroleum and petroleum products.
Adopted by unanimous vote.
P rep a red  in the course of the Council's consultations.
r e s o l u t i o n  7 0 6  1 5  A u g u s t  1 9 9 1
Relating  to the terms for the limited sole of Iraqi oil and oil products, for the purpose, 
inter alia, of meeting essential civilian needs under strict and close United Nations 
monitoring, and to the establishment by the United Nations of an escrow account to be 
administered by the Secretary-General.
A dop ted  by a vote of 13 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 1 abstention (Yemen).
Sp on so rs : Belgium, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
resolution 707 1 5  A u g u s t  1 9 9 1
Relating, infer alio, to the Council's condemnation of Iraq's "serious violation" of a num­
ber of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 and of its undertakings to 
cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA, and containing a list of nine de­
mands to Iraq.
A dop ted  by unanimous vote.
Sp o n so rs : France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
r e s o l u t i o n  7 1 3 t  1 9  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 1
Relating , inter alia, to the confirmation of the ceiling of $1.6 billion in limited Iraqi oil 
sale, established by the Council in resolution 706, and to the immediate release by the 
Secretary-General of one third of that amount from an escrow account established by 
the United Nations, subject to the availability of funds in that account, to meet Iraq's es­
sential civilian needs.
A dop ted  by a vote of 13 in favour, 1 against (Cuba) and 1 abstention (Yemen).
Sponsors: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
RESOLUTION 7 1 5 1 1  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 1
Relating , inter alio, to the Security Council's demand that Iraq meet unconditionally al' 
obligations under two plans approved by the Council for the future monitoring and 
verification of Iraq's compliance with resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).
Adopted by unanimous vote.
Spon so rs: Belgium, France, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States.
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LETTER DATED 2 APRIL 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT 
REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL
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UNITED
NATIONS
“a ·: ^OiM'
Security Council
S
DiStr.
CCNCttAL
5/22435 
3 April 1991
OftI(;tHALt ENGLISH
LETTER d a t e d  2 APRIL 1991 FROM THE PERMAJIBHT REPRESENTATIVE OF 
TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TQ THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITTf COUNCIL
Upon instructions from my Government, l h»v* th· honour to Inform you th»t 
ow*n<j to tn« action taken by tha Iraqi army »gainat th* local population In 
Northern Iraq, approximately 220,000 Iraqi citiien«, many of them wom«n and 
children, are currently massed along the Turkish border.
It is apparent that the Iraqi Goverwnant forces are deliberately preasiog 
these people towards the Turkish border in order to drive them out of their 
country. Those entions violate all norms of behaviour towards civilian populations 
and constitute an excessive use of force and ft threat to the region's peace and 
security. In tb* course of the Iraqi operations, which ate being carried out with 
the support of helicopters and artillery, many mortar shells have actually landed 
on Turkish territory.
Turkey is caking appropriate action to bring urgent humanitarian assistance to 
the affected Iraqi civilians. It is expected that the heavy burden of caring for 
these victims of repression will be shared by international organizations as well 
as by those countries in a position to assist.
I request that a meeting of the Security Council be convened immediately to 
consider this alarming situation and to adopt the necessary measures to put an end 
to this inhuman repression being carried out on a massive scale.
Mustafa AKÇIN 
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
91-10567 2240h (E)
MMwei
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APPENDIX III
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688
g / p es / ÍJ··'·'' ( i V·/ i ;
‘3 apriL' 1^91
' resol.utLon 688 ('1991)
adopted by tbe security counciL at its 2 9.82nd meetipy^
on 8 apt'il/ 1991 
■ the, security council,
mindful of its duties ano its responsibilities under tne 
charter of the united nations for the maintenance of 
international peace and security,
: , recal’l'ing artrcl'e 2,- paragraph 7, of the charter of the
: : un i’t e d . n a 1 1 on &,'
'1; ''1: . gravely concerned by the repression of the iraqi- civilian 
.poput'ation in many parts of iraq, including most recently in 
■■kurdi's'h poputated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees 
towards and across international frontiers and to cross borner 
■incursions, which threaten international peace and security in 
the region ,■
‘ . ·: deepl'y
, invoI'ved
disturbed by the magnitude of the human sufferinu
taking' note of the tetters sent by the representatives o t
turkey and france to the united nations oated 2 apriL· 1991 and 
4 apr il· 1991-,respectively (s/?2U7)8 and s/22kk2) ,
taking note also of tne letters sent by the permanent 
representative of tne isl.'amic republic of ıran to the united 
nations dateo' 3 and k april' 1 9oi, respectively (s/22¿i36 and 
s / 2 2 k k 7 )  ,·
reaffirmin(i tne commitment of all member states to trie 
sovereKjnty, territorial' inteiirity ano political indeoende?ice 
of Iraq and o.f all st-ates in tne area,
bearing in mind tne secretary-general's report of 20 march 
1991 ('s/22366),
I'.'i condemns the repression of the iraqi civilian 
population in many parts of iraq, incluoing most recently in 
kurdish populated areas, trie consequences of v/nich threaten 
international' peace and security in trie region semicolon
2‘'.i demands that iraq, as a contribution to ,/iemovin(j trie
threat'to international peace and security in_tne re(.iion ,
Tmmedlately end ThTsHP^p'rfr^'rori ano‘"e'x"iTr'e's'ses tne nope in tne 
same context that an open oialoijue will take place to ensure 
that the human and pol-itical m i n t s  of all iraqi citizens are 
respected semicolon
'3'.' insists that ıran ali.ow immeoíate access by 
international' humanitarian organizations to all· those in need 
of assistance in al!, parts of iraq and to make available all, 
necessary facilities for tneir operations s8micolpn_
requests 'the secretary iieneral to pursue riis 
J]ii!!]âh2^ .t,ar.ıan.--effort ıran ano to report forthwith, if
appropriate on the basis of a further mission to tne region, on 
the plight of the iraqi civilian population, ano in particular 
the !iur¿i_3jT_.p_opulatlo.n , S.Uff ering from trie repression in al,l_ 
i't^_forms^ inflicted by the iraqi autriorities semicolon
‘d'V. requests further tne secretary-general' lö'ü'se ai.l_tj'ie
resources_<i.t, h;is disposal, incluo'irTy' those of the.Fet'.'evam
uniTed'nations agencies', to address urgently the critical needs 
of tne refuqess and displaceo iraqi population semicolon
6'·.’' appeals to al'l member states and to al,I humanitarian 
organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief 
efforts semicolon
that Iraq cooperate with tne 
to these enns semicolon
j'2 oemanos
secretary-general 
.8".' decides 
end of resolution
;o remain seized of tne matter,·
col ckd
worm
260 kut magsg ¿4'
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THE DECISIONS OF THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
CONCERNING OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
Anayasanın 92 nci Maddesi Uyarınca Hükümete tzin Verilmesine Dair
(  R£smî Gazete ile yayımı : 14,8,1990 Sayı : 20605)
Karar No. 
107
Karar Tarihi 
12.8.1990
Irak’ın Kuveyt’i işgali ve sonrasında meydana gelen ve ülkemizi yakından ilgilendiren olaylar 
sebebiyle, Türk Devletinin ve Cumhuriyetinin varlığını tehlikeye düşürmesi muhtemel gelişme­
ler karşısında, Anayasanın 117 nci maddesine göre millî güvenliğin sağlanmasından ve Silahlı 
Kuvvetlerin yurt savunmasına hazırlanmasından Yüce Meclise karşı sorumlu bulunan Hükü­
mete; Ülkemize bir tecavüz vukuu halinde derhal mukabele edilmesi maksadına münhasır ola­
rak, savaş hali ilanı, Silahlı Kuvvetlerin kullanılması, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülke­
lere gönderilmesi veya yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin Türkiye’de bulunması konularında Anayasa­
nın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 12.8.1990 tarihli 
126 net Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.
Körfez Krizi Sebebiyle, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Yabancı Ülkelere Gön­
derilmesine ve Yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetlerin Türkiye’de Bulunmasına, 
Anayasanın 92 nci Maddesi Uyarınca tzin Verilmesine Dair
(Resmî Gazele ile yayımı : 7,9.1990 Sayı : 20628)
Karar No, 
108
Karar Tarihi 
5 . 9 .  1990
Irak’ın Kuveyt’i işgal ve ilhak etmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan Körfez Krizi sebebiyle, öncelik­
le Ortadoğu’da barışın ve istikrarın yeniden tesisini ve ülkemizin muhtemel tehlikelere karşı 
güvenliğinin idame ettirilmesini sağlamak; kriz süresince ve sonrasında hasıl olabilecek geliş­
meler istikametinde Türkiye’nin yüksek menfaatlerini etkili bir şekilde kollamak, hadiselerin 
seyrine göre ileride telafisi güç bir durumla karşılaşmamaya yönelik süratli ve dinamik bir po­
litika izlenmesine yardımcı olmak üzere; lüzum, hudut ve şümulü Hükümetçe takdir ve tayin 
olunacak şekilde Tü. k Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve yabancı silahlı 
kuvvetlerin Türkiye’de bulunmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi, Tür­
kiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 5.9.1990 tarihli 3 üncü Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.
Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Yabancı Ülkelere Gönderilmesine ve Yaban­
cı Silahlı Kuvvetlerin Türkiye’de Bulunmasına, Bu Kuvvetlerin 
Kullanılmalanna İzin Yerilmesine Dair
(Eısmî Gazete ile yayımı : 17.1.1991 Sayı : 20758 Mükerrer)
Karar No. 
126
Karar Tarihi 
17 . 1 . 1991
Irak’ın Kuveyt’i işgal ve ilhak etmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan Körfez krizi sebebiyle öncelikle 
Ortadoğu’da barışın ve istikrarın yeniden tesisi için 678 sayılı Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi 
Karannı desteklemek ve ülkemizin muhtemel tehlikelere karşı güvenliğinin idame ettirilmesini 
sağlamak, kriz süresince ve sonrasında hasıl olabilecek gelişmeler istikametinde Türkiye'nin 
yüksek menfaatlerini etkili bir şekilde korumak ve kollamak, hadiselerin seyrine göre ileride 
telafisi güç bir durumla karşılaşmamaya yönelik süratli ve dinamik bir politika izlenmesine 
yardımcı olmak üzere; lüzum, hudut, şümul ve zamanı Hükümetçe takdir ve tayin olunacak 
şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve yabancı Silahlı Kuvvetle­
rin Türkiye’de bulunmasına, bu kuvvetlerin kullanılmalarına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uya­
rınca izin verilmesi, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 17,1,1991 tarihli 66 na Birleşiminde ka­
rarlaştırılmıştır.
Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev Süresinin
Uzatılmasına İlişkin
(Resmî Gazete ile yayım ı : 28.6.1992 S a y ı : 21268)
Karar No. 
180
Karar Tiirihi 
26.6.1992
Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak’da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yöne­
len ve sımrlanmızın fizikî güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve sosyal 
düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekranna müncer olabilecek 
gelişmeleri, Irak’ın toprak bütünlüğünü mutlaka koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişme­
lere mani olmak, Kuzey Irak’da sağlanmış bulunan nisbi sükûnetin ve bölge halkının insani 
ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyet­
lerin güvenlik içinde devamım sağlamak amacıyla. Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin 
688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 17.1.1991 tarih 
ve 126 sayılı karanna dayanılarak başlatılan ‘Trovide Comfort II’' harekatı çerçevesinde ülke­
mizde konuşlandırılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 30 Haziran 1992 tarihinden itibaren 
6 ay süreyle uzaulmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabana ülke silahlı kuvvetleri 
personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye’nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün 
amaçlanna uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararlan almaya Bakanlar Kurulunun 
yetkili kılınmasına; Anayasamn 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi. Genel Kurulun 26.6.1992 
tarihlî 89 uncu Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.
TBMM Karan
Ülkemizde Konıışlandmları Çokuluslu Gücün Görev 
Süresinin U/alıImasına İlişkin
Karar No. 206 Karar Tarihi : 2‘4.12.1992
Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak’da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yö­
nelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini lelıdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve 
sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabile­
cek gelişmeleri, irak’ın toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere 
mani olmak. Kuzey Irak’da bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleş­
miş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak 
amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönündc tutularak 
ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin 17/I/I99I tarih ve 126 sayılı Kararı’na dayanılarak baş­
latılan “ Provide Comfort IP* harckötı çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan çokuluslu gü­
cün görev süresinin 31 Aralık 1992 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay süre ile uzatılmasına; çokuluslu 
gücün yapısının, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacak­
ları statünün tayini, Türkiye’nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanıl­
masıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve mevzuatı çıkarmaya ve gerektiğinde harekâtı sona 
erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulunun yetkili kılınmasına; Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin 
verilmesi. Genel Kurulun 24.12.1992 tarihli 51 inci Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.
Ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev 
Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin
Karar No. : 245 Karar Tarihi : 24.6.1993
Körfez savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak’da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yö­
nelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve 
sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabile­
cek gelişmeleri, Irak’m toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere 
mani olmak, Kuzey Irak’da sağlanmış bulunan nisbi sükunetin ve bölge halkının insani ihti­
yaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlannca yürütülen faaliyetlerin 
güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin 688 
sayılı Kararı da gözönündc tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nın 17/1/1991 tarih ve 
126 sayılı KararPna dayanılarak başlaülan “ Provide Comfort 11“ huzur harekaü çerçevesin­
de ülkemizde konuşlandırılan ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin 24/12/1992 tarihli ve 206 
sayılı karan ile görev süresi uzatılan çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 1 Temmuz 1993 tarihin­
den itibaren 6 ay .daha uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabana ülke silahlı 
kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye’nin güce katkısı ve 
bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararlan almaya ve gerekti­
ğinde harekatı sona erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulu’nun yetkili kılınması için; Anayasa’nın 92 nci 
maddesine göre izin verilmesi, Genel Kurulun 24.6,1993 tarihli 117 nci Birleşiminde kararlaş- 
ürılmıştır.
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TBMM Karan
ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev 
Süresinin Uzatılmasına İlişkin
Karar No : 279 Karar Tarihi : 28.12.1993
Körfez savaşım takiben Kuzey îrak’da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yö­
nelen ve sınırlarımızın fizikî güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve 
sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabile­
cek gelişmeleri, Irak'ın bütünlüğünün korunması, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin dış politikasının 
temel ilkelerinden biri olduğundan, Irak’m toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gere­
kirse bu gelişmelere mani olmak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin, Kuzey Irak ahalisini vahim insan 
hakları ihlallerine karşı korumayı öncelikli bir insani görev olarak gördüğünü dikkate alarak 
Kuzey Irak’da bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarımn karşılanabilmesi için Birleşmiş Milletler bağlı 
kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak amacıyla, Birleşmiş 
Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin 688 sayılı Kararı da gözönünde tutularak ve Türkiye Büyük 
Millet Meclisi'nin 1 7 . 1 . 1 9 9 1  tarih ve 1 2 6  sayılı Kararı’na dayanılarak başlatılan “ Provide 
Comfort II” huzur harekatı çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan ve Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi’nin 2 4 . 6 . 1 9 9 3  tarihli ve  2 4 5  sayılı karan ile görev süresi uzatılan çokuluslu gücün gö­
rev s ü r e s i n i n  31 .A.ralık 1 9 9 3  larihinden itibaren 6  ay süreyle uzatılmasına; çokuluslu gücün 
yapısı, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde tabi olacakları statü­
nün tayini, Türkiye’nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlarına uygun biçimde kullanılmasıyla 
ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve gerektiğinde harekau sona erdirmeye Bakanlar Kurulu’nun 
yetkili kılınması için Anayasanın 9 2  nci maddesine göre izin verilmesi. Genel Kurulun 2 8 . 1 2 . 1 9 9 3  
tarihli 5 8  inci Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.
TBMM Kararı
ülkemizde Konuşlandırılan Çokuluslu Gücün Görev 
Süresinin Uzatılmasına ilişkin
Karar No : 325 Karar Tarihi : 14.6.1994
Körfez Savaşını takiben Kuzey Irak’da meydana gelen olaylar sonucunda ülkemize yö­
nelen ve sınırlarımızın fiziki güvenliğini tehdit etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda ekonomik ve 
sosyal düzenimizi de zorlayacak boyutlara erişen toplu göç hareketinin tekrarına yol açabile­
cek gelişmeleri, Irakhn toprak bütünlüğünü koruyarak caydırmak, gerekirse bu gelişmelere 
mani olmak. Kuzey Irak’da bölge halkının insani ihtiyaçlarının karşılanabilmesi için Birleş­
miş Milletler bağlı kuruluşlarınca yürütülen faaliyetlerin güvenlik içinde devamını sağlamak 
amacıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin 688 sayılı Karan da gözönünde tutularak 
ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nin 17.1.1991 tarih ve 126 sayılı Kararı’na dayanılarak başla­
tılan “ provide Comfort II” huzur harekatı çerçevesinde ülkemizde konuşlandırılan ve Türki­
ye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 28.12.1993 tarihli ve 279 sayılı kararı ile görev sûresi uzatılan 
çokuluslu gücün görev süresinin 30 Haziran 1994 tarihinden itibaren 6 ay süreyle uzatılması­
na; çok uluslu gücün yapısı, güce bağlı yabancı ülke silahlı kuvvetleri personelinin ülkemizde 
tabi olacakları statünün tayini, Türkiye’nin güce katkısı ve bu gücün amaçlanna uygun bi­
çimde kullanılmasıyla ilgili bütün kararları almaya ve gerektiğinde harekatı sona erdirmeye 
Bakanlar Kurulu’nun yetkili kılınması için Anayasanın 92 nci maddesine göre izin verilmesi. 
Genel Kurulun 14.6.1994 tarihli 116 ncı Birleşiminde kararlaştırılmıştır.
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